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Hybrid Hysteria  
Sven Biscop 
Is “hybrid” about to replace 
“comprehensive” as the favourite 
container notion of the Brussels foreign 
policy community? They might not be so 
different, in fact. Both a hybrid and a 
comprehensive approach mean the 
integrated use of a broad range of 
instruments of external action towards 
the achievement of a foreign policy 
objective. It’s just that the hybrid 
approach put into practice by Russia 
today seeks to achieve rather less friendly 
aims than the EU’s own comprehensive 
approach. The hybrid approach is the 
comprehensive approach gone over to 
the dark side of the force. 
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change or secession of part of the territory 
(which can then quickly become a puppet 
state). Whether the method (the warfare) be 
hybrid or covert or not: the key thing is that 
this is war.  
 
One step down from war is subversion, which is 
what many fear is happening in the Baltic 
states: fomenting political unrest by all means 
short of military action on the ground, but 
including for example cyber attacks, incursions 
into national airspace and territorial waters, 
espionage, corrupting politicians and other 
opinion-makers, propaganda, and economic 
sticks and carrots. The aim is to turn part of 
the population against the regime so as to 
weaken it and render it less able to exercise its 
sovereignty, including in foreign policy. 
Staying below the threshold of clear armed 
aggression, subversion blurs the boundaries of 
what constitutes an attack that would trigger 
an armed response or the activation of a 
collective defence commitment such as 
NATO’s Article 5. Thus the target 
government and its allies are kept off-balance.  
 
Covert wars and active subversion are 
obviously violations of national sovereignty 
and therefore illegal under international law. 
Because today this is happening in Europe, it 
makes us nervous, but we seem to have 
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Before we get all hysterical over so-called hybrid 
threats, it is essential that we define what we are 
talking about. Only then can we decide if and 
how our strategy needs to be adapted.  
 
The most eye-catching hybrid approach is 
hybrid warfare as practiced by Russia in Ukraine: 
fomenting armed rebellion by covert (or at 
least officially denied) arms deliveries, troop 
contributions and military operations, 
propping up friendly local leaders, propaganda, 
promises of economic benefits and threats of 
economic reprisals. The aim can be regime 
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forgotten to which extent we have engaged in 
this ourselves in other parts of the world. 
Many regimes in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia were subverted or brought down and 
replaced by a leader judged more amenable by 
the West during the Cold War and – let’s not 
kid ourselves – even afterwards. This is not to 
justify Russia’s actions in any way, but to put 
them into perspective. These are not dark new 
powers that Russia is displaying, but time-
honed tactics. Alarmism is not just 
unnecessary; it is also singularly unhelpful.  
 
For one, it has led commentators to apply the 
adjective “hybrid” far too widely, to any action 
aimed at gaining influence within the EU and 
NATO. Attempting to play off one Member 
State against another, sponsoring Euro-sceptic 
and Russia-friendly political parties and 
NGOs, buying space to spread their message 
in the media, investing in critical infrastructure, 
promising financial aid to vulnerable 
governments, instrumentalizing the energy 
trade, even military posturing: we may not like 
it when Russia does this, but these are normal 
instruments of statecraft. Some of their uses 
may be reprehensible, but they are certainly 
not illegal. Are we not regularly using the same 
levers of power? Europe funds and supports 
political dissidents and human rights activists 
across the world, promotes democratization 
(which in many countries really means regime 
change), and instrumentalizes its economic 
power through political conditionality. Of 
course, our objectives are not as malicious as 
those of Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine, at least not 
in our own mind. How they are perceived by 
some in the target states is another matter. We 
are just no longer used, since the Cold War 
ended, to be on the receiving end ourselves.  
 
Furthermore, hybrid warfare, subversion and 
gaining influence are all instruments of 
statecraft, just like – for good or for bad – 
terrorism, aerial bombardment and invasion 
are instruments. And one does not adopt 
strategies aimed exclusively at an instrument – 
one makes strategies tailored to the actors that 
might use those instruments. A strategy against 
hybrid threats is as meaningless as a grand 
strategy therefore as declaring war on terrorism 
is, if not more so, given the range of activities 
that hybrid threats can cover. Some general 
counter-measures must of course be taken: if 
one fears aerial bombardment, one invests in 
air defences and shelters; if cyber attacks are a 
likely threat, then one builds up one’s cyber 
defences. But this reactive component ought 
not to be the main part of our strategy. The 
major, proactive part of strategy ought to aim 
at changing the behaviour of the actor that 
might undertake bombardment or cyber 
attacks. Who that actor is determines how and 
when these instruments may be used against us 
and how likely that is.  
 
WHICH MEASURES SHOULD EUROPE 
THEN TAKE?  
True, until recently the idea of war, hybrid or 
otherwise, against an EU/NATO Member 
State was simply unimaginable. That is no 
longer so, but still the risk remains very small. 
Because of our nuclear and conventional 
deterrence, which is assured thanks to our 
alliance with the US, any potential aggressor 
state knows that the cost of an attack will be 
unacceptably high. An additional reason why 
Russia’s covert war against Ukraine specifically 
should not be seen as the prelude to similar 
operations against an EU/NATO Member 
State is that for Moscow, the Ukrainian crisis is 
almost akin to a domestic issue. That view is 
not acceptable to us, of course, but it does 
explain both why Russia is willing to take 
heavy economic and diplomatic punishment 
over Ukraine and why Russia will not aggress 
the Baltics next. Unless, perhaps, we ourselves 
choose to escalate the Ukrainian crisis, in 
which case Russia may choose to act in 
another theatre by way of countermeasure. In 
spite of the small risk, Europeans do have to 
upgrade their forces though, for deterrence 
relies far too much on the US.  
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What about subversion? For an outside actor 
to subvert part of a population of a state there 
have to be pre-existing grievances of sufficient 
severity against that state,  as well as an affinity 
(cultural, linguistic, historical, political) with the 
external actor, which has to offer a credible 
and attractive alternative project. In other 
words, before subversion is possible, there has 
to be a domestic political failure. These 
conditions are clearly present in Ukraine, 
which has been divided for years between a 
European and a Russian-oriented public, and 
where the government has not managed to 
provide equally for the security, freedom and 
prosperity of all citizens. Why would anyone 
think similar Russian subversion would be 
feasible anywhere else in the EU? What 
attractive narrative could Russia possibly offer 
to an EU citizen – as long as the EU and its 
Member States uphold our social model that 
ensures that everybody does indeed feel 
respected, and provided for, as a citizen? The 
only exception could be the Russian minorities 
in the Baltic states, which is why the EU 
should help these three governments to fully 
integrate all of their citizens in the polity, 
politically, socially and economically.  
 
A much greater threat, which has already 
materialized, is subversion by jihadist 
extremists, who convince EU citizens to join 
their ranks and go and fight in Iraq and Syria, 
and to commit acts of terrorism in their home 
countries in Europe. This has been possible 
precisely because sizeable proportions of our 
citizens with an immigrant background feel 
greatly disenchanted with our society, which it 
is felt has relegated them to the margins. The 
greater their despair with their future in 
Europe, the more attractive the IS narrative 
becomes, offering adventure, prosperity or 
salvation – whatever the prospective recruit is 
most longing for.1 The only safeguard against 
such subversion is to make sure that our social 
model does not leave anybody behind, and to 
ensure that all citizens’ security is protected, 
their voice heard in democratic decision-
making, their human rights respected, their 
equal treatment before the law guaranteed, and, 
most importantly, that all citizens can enjoy 
what they perceive as a fair share of the 
prosperity that our societies produce. The first 
line of defence against subversion could be said 
to be Juncker’s investment plan therefore.  
 
Finally, we can take measures to reduce our 
vulnerability and to prevent outside actors 
from gaining undue political influence inside 
the EU. Obvious measures include increasing 
cyber defences and the security of critical 
infrastructure. Another set of measures that is 
already in the making concerns diversifying our 
energy supply while integrating our energy 
markets, thus reducing the opportunity for 
energy blackmail. A new area in which EU 
policy is called for is oversight of foreign 
investment in sensitive sectors (such as 
banking, energy, transport, tele-
communications, and, very importantly, the 
media). While there is no harm in a company 
from one EU Member State controlling major 
shares of such sectors in another, the EU 
ought to adopt legislation to limit the degree of 
control that can be exercised by any foreign 
actor (private or public), from Russia, China, or 
elsewhere.2 A fourth area is anti-corruption, at 
the European and national level. Has the time 
not come for a harmonization across the EU 
of the rules that govern the funding of political 
parties?  
 
An area in which the EU should not venture, is 
propaganda. So-called strategic 
communications are important: governments 
must explain to their own citizens what they 
are doing and why. When they intervene in 
another country (diplomatically, economically, 
militarily) they should communicate with 
citizens there as well. If a certain population is 
specifically targeted by a propaganda campaign 
by a foreign actor, or a foreign-funded internal 
actor, a specific counter-narrative can be 
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developed and a public diplomacy campaign 
launched. But all of this is something else than 
propaganda, because a democracy ultimately 
deserves truth. That is why if the EU does what 
it should do and does it well, free media will 
convey that much more effectively and credibly 
than any government-owned media outlet will 
ever be able to.  
 
A European Union that would consolidate its 
internal cohesion and reduce its vulnerability to 
malevolent external actors through what, if one 
wants, can be called a “counter-hybrid” strategy, 
would be much better placed to design and 
implement the external strategies that it really 
needs: a Russia strategy, a Middle East strategy 
etc. Ultimately, one cannot make strategy 
against an adjective. 
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Endnotes 
1 Rik Coolsaet, What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to IS? Insights from the Belgian Case. Egmont Paper No. 75. Brussels: 
Egmont Institute, 2015. See: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/egmont-papers-
75_16x24_v2.pdf.  
2 In the case of the media, one is tempted to explicitly mention Australia. 
